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Abstract: Problem statement: A worm is a malicious piece of code that self-propagates, often via 
network connections, to exploit security flaws in computers connected through the network. In general, 
worms do not need any human intervention to propagate and are considered a real threat to network 
assets and the properties of organizations. An Intrusion Detection Systems (IDSs) are employed to 
detect the presence of the worms in the network. Approach: This study proposed a new behaviour-
based worm detection and signature automation approach that consists of scanning characteristics to 
find vulnerable hosts and indicate the correlation between an infected host and potential destination 
hosts. Results: This approach can be distinguish between network scanning (random and sequential 
TCP and UDP worm scanning) triggered by infected and non-infected hosts. In addition, the ability to 
detect the worms based on its behaviours. Conclusion: Identifying network worms at an early stage 
can increase the protection of network services and vulnerable hosts. 
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INTRODUCTION 
 
  Nowadays,  many organizations  share  information 
through  a  network  and  make  the  data  available  and 
accessible via the Internet. Due to this fact, there has 
been a significant increase in daily transactions that are 
made on the internet; these are vulnerable to significant 
threats such as unauthorized access or theft of private 
information.  This  dependency  on  the  internet  makes 
network  assets  and  information  on  the  network  a 
valuable  target  for  attackers  and  hackers.  One  of  the 
most prevalent threats to networks is network worms 
because these can spread without human intervention. 
Once a worm infects any host in a network, it will have 
huge  destructive  effects  over  the  network  topologies 
and  resources.  Many  Intrusion  Detection  Systems 
(IDSs)  are  deployed  in  the  edge  router  and  default 
gateway  to  detect  worms  before  they  infect  the 
network.  However,  many  network  worms  can  go 
through  IDSs  and  successfully  infect  the  network, 
especially zero-day worms (i.e., worms with signatures 
that do not exist in the IDS signature database).  
  The  severity  of  computer  worms  has  grabbed 
researchers’  attention  in  the  last  few  years.  Many 
approaches  have  been  proposed  for  behaviour-based 
worm  detection  and  signature  automation;  some  of 
these  approaches  are  based  on  Artificial  Neural 
Networks (ANNs) others are based on the connection 
failures that occur in the network.  
  A  scholar  by  Stopel  et  al.  (2006)  proposed  an 
approach  for  detecting  worm-infected  hosts  that  is 
based  on  an  Artificial  Neural  Network  (ANN).  This 
approach measures properties of the infected host such 
as Central Processing Unit (CPU) and memory usage; 
these  computer  measurements  have  high 
dimensionality, which makes the training process time 
very  long.  Thus,  feature  selection  techniques  are 
employed  to  reduce  the  dimensionality;  some 
techniques  are  as  follows:  (1)  finding  the  relation 
between  the  inputs  and  hidden  neuron’s  relative 
variance; (2) the Fisher score ranking; and (3) the gain 
ratio filter. The outputs of these techniques are features 
that  impact  the  behaviour  of  computers  which  are 
infected  by  worms.  These  techniques  evaluate  each 
technique by pre-processing the dataset and training the 
ANN model with the pre-processed data based on the 
training dataset. The ability of the model to detect the 
presence of a new computer worm is then evaluated, 
particularly during heavy user activity on the infected 
computers. However, many worms (especially zero day 
worms) bypass the IDSs because its signatures does not 
exist in signatures database (Singh et al., 2005). J. Computer Sci., 7 (11): 1724-1728, 2011 
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  In contrast, Moskovitch et al. (2008) proposed an 
approach  based  on  computer  behaviour  that  uses 
Artificial  Neural  Networks  (ANNs)  to  classify  the 
computer as infected or not. To validate his assumption, 
he  infected  a  computer  with  five  different  worms 
having  different  behaviours  and  ran  several  different 
applications  (e.g.,  MSN,  Windows  Media  Player  and 
Microsoft  Word).  He  monitored  and  logged  323 
features  to  create  eight  datasets,  each  containing 
separate monitored samples of each of the five injected 
worms and samples of a normal computer’s behaviour 
without any injected worms. The ANN approaches are 
computationally  advantageous  when  real-time 
computation is needed and have the potential to detect 
previously  unknown  worms  with  a  high  level  of 
accuracy.  In  addition,  ANN  can  reduce  the  feature 
dimensionality.  The  two  biggest  shortcomings  of 
ANN techniques are the (1) training period (they take 
a long time to train) and (2) the involvement problem 
(any  changes  in  the  target  environment  affects  the 
training dataset). 
 
MATERIALS ADN METHODS 
 
  The  proposed  approach,  which  is  named 
behaviour-Based  Worm  Detection  and  Signature 
Automation  (BBWDSA),  is  based  on  the  assumption 
that the  first step performed by network  worms is to 
scan a network for vulnerable hosts and services; once a 
vulnerable  host  is  found,  the  malicious  code  will  be 
transferred  from  the  sender  to  the  destination.  The 
packets used to transfer malicious code from the sender 
to the destination have specific and noticeable traffic. 
  Once the malicious code infects the target host, the 
target host scans the network to find vulnerable services 
that have been infected. Figure 1 shows the architecture 
of the BBWDSA approach. 
  BBWDSA consists of three sub-approaches: 
 
·  The network scanning approach aims to detect TCP 
and  UDP  random  and  sequential  scanning  and 
consists of three sub-modules: (1) a filtering module, 
(2) traffic statistical analyzer module and (3) cross-
relation module 
·  The network worm’s correlation approach aims to 
detect  Destination  Port  Correlation  (DPC) 
behaviour for detected scanning IPs in the network 
and  consists  of  two  sub-modules:  (1)  the 
Destination  Port  Correlation  Based  Worm 
Detection  module  (DPCBWD)  and  (2)  the  alert 
module 
 
   
 
Fig. 1: Architecture of the BBWDSA approach 
 
·  The worm signature automation approach aims to 
generate a behaviour signature for detected worms 
 
Network  scanning  approach:  Network  scanning  is 
used  to  identify  active  hosts,  services,  operating 
systems  and  applications  running  on  each  computer 
system within the targeted network; it is considered the 
first step for an attacker to gain access to the network. 
 
Network  worm’s  correlation  approach:  Worm 
behaviour is usually repetitious and predictable, which 
makes it possible to be detected. As defined in (Gu et 
al.,  2004)  worm  behaviour  can  be  predicted  by 
correlating an incoming connection on a given port with 
a  subsequent  ongoing  infection  at  that  port;  this 
behaviour  is  called  Destination-Source  Correlation 
(DSC). 
  The start point for this approach begins after the 
network scanning approach sends out the scanning IPs. 
The correlation approach consists of two sub-modules 
(i.e.,  Destination  Port  Correlation  Based  Worm 
Detection  (DPCBWD)  and  alert  modules).  Figure  2 
shows the correlation approach flow chart. 
 
Destination port correlation based worm detection 
module  (DPCBWD):  Many  approaches  have  been J. Computer Sci., 7 (11): 1724-1728, 2011 
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proposed  to  detect  network  worms.  One  is  based  on 
connection failure; this frequently occurs in a network 
being scanned. Another is based on using an ANN to 
detect  network  worms.  The  drawback  of  these 
approaches is a high false positive rate because these 
approaches do not consider all abnormal behaviours for 
network worms which can clearly appear in the target 
finding (e.g., network scanning) and propagation (e.g., 
source and destination port correlation) phases of the 
network worm life cycle. The DPCBWD module was 
proposed  to  detect  destination  port  correlation  (DPC) 
between the scanning IPs which detected by scanning 
approach and source IPs. The following is an example 
of  destination  port  correlation.  Suppose  that  a  host 
receives  a  packet  on  port  i  and  then  starts  sending 
packets destined for port i. If the number of sending 
packets  destined  for  port  i  to  different  destination 
hosts  exceeds  the  predefined  threshold,  the  host 
becomes suspicious. Figure 3 shows DPC behaviour.  
  Suppose that 192.168.1.2 is detected as a scanner 
IP (as detected by the scanning approach). As shown in 
Fig.  3,  host  192.168.1.13  sends  out  packets  targeting 
port  25  to  other  hosts  (192.168.1.13,  192.168.1.30, 
192.168.1.15,  192.168.1.77,  192.168.1.7  and 
192.168.1.2).  Since  host  192.168.1.2  sends  out  the 
received  packet  to  other  hosts  with  the  same  port 
number  (25),  this  means  that  192.168.1.2  is  a 
vulnerable  host  that  exhibits  DPC  behaviour.  On  the 
other  hand,  hosts  192.168.1.13,  192.168.1.30, 
192.168.1.15,  192.168.1.77  and  192.168.1.7  do  not 
send any packets targeting port 25, which means that 
these hosts do not exhibit DPC behaviour. Thus, we can 
conclude  that  192.168.1.2  is  an  infected  IP  since  it 
exhibits scanning and DPC behaviours. 
 
 
 
Fig. 2: The correlation approach flow charts 
  As each worm performs a scan but the opposite is 
not  true,  the  DPC  behaviour  in  addition  to  scanning 
behaviour  is  considered  to  detect  the  presence  of 
worms  in  the  network  rather  than  considering  the 
scanning behaviour only to increase the accuracy of 
worm detection. 
  Since existing malicious codes share the scanning 
activities with network worms, the scanning log Table 
is created to log all IPs that perform network scanning 
but do not show DPC behaviour for further analysis by 
a network administrator.  
  Meanwhile,  some  applications  exhibit  DPC 
behaviours  but  are  not  worms;  to  overcome  this 
problem, port DB is used to log all applications ports 
that  exhibit  DPC-like  behaviour.  An  example  of  this 
type of application is Gnutella. Gnutella  may receive 
TCP/6346 traffic as well as send data to other clients 
through TCP/6346 elsewhere. The Gnutella network is 
a  peer-to-peer  (P2P)  network,  which  allows  users  on 
different  networks to share files. However, each  user 
still must connect to an ‘ultrapeer’, which is a server 
that lists files shared by connected users. This makes it 
possible  to  search  for  files  across  hundreds  or  even 
thousands of other computers connected to the network. 
Gnutella  clients  include  Acquisition  for  Mac  and 
BearShare and Morpheus for Windows. By considering 
the  applications  that  exhibit  DPC-like  behaviour,  the 
occurrence  of  false  positives  can  be  reduced.  After 
worm  packets  are  received  from  the  DPC,  the 
destination  port  for  each  packet  is  extracted  and 
compared  with  existing  ports.  If  a  match  exists,  the 
worm packet is ignored; otherwise, the worm packet is 
forwarded to the alert module. 
 
Alert  module:  This  module  is  responsible  for 
generating alerts for detected worms and scanner IPs. 
The generated alerts are presented as reports. Table 1 
shows  an  example  of  alert  report  information  for 
detected worms   Table 2 shows alert report information 
for scanning IPs. 
 
 
 
Fig. 3: DPC Behaviour J. Computer Sci., 7 (11): 1724-1728, 2011 
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Table 1: Example of alert report information for detected worms 
      Worm type 
Source IP  Destination  port  severity (%) 
10.20.200.160  80  TCP  98 
10.20.200.140  90  UDP  56 
10.20.200.200  80  TCP  40 
10.20.200.120  90  TCP  10 
 
Table 2: Example of alert report information for network scanning  
Source  Destination  Destination  Scanning 
IP  IP  port  type 
10.20.200.160  10.20.200.98  1434  UDP Random scanning 
10.20.200.160  10.20.200.98  1434  UDP Sequential scanning 
10.20.200.70  10.20.200.172  25  TCP Sequential scanning 
10.20.200.30  10.20.200.22  80  TCP Random scanning 
 
Table 3: Example HS table  
Port  Protocol  Services 
7  TCP  Echo 
21  TCP  FTP 
22  TCP  SSH 
53  UDP  DNS 
67,68  UDP  DHCP 
80  TCP  HTTP 
135,1025  TCP  DCOM 
445  TCP  NetBIOS 
445  UDP  NetBIOS 
5900  TCP  VNC 
5000  TCP  UPNP 
 
Calculating  the  severity  percentage  and  scanning 
rate:  The  alert  module  consists  of  two  tables:  High 
Severity (HS) and Low Severity (LS) port table. Each 
table  consists  of  three  fields  (port,  protocol  and 
service).  The  ports  are  classified  based  on  DShield. 
DShield provides reports about most ports attacked per 
target  and  source.  The  ports  in  HS  have  one 
configurable weight as well as the ports in LS. Table 3 
shows the sample ports for HS.  
  The  following  equation  is  used  to  calculate  the 
severity percentage: 
 
Severity percentage for i
Total destination address of i
w 100%
Total destination address for all in fected ips
=
 
+ ´  
 
 
where, i is the infected IP and w is the weight of the 
destination port for the detected worm. 
  The worms and network scanning have destructive 
effects  on  the  network  resources  and  topology. 
Therefore, detecting worms and network scanning at an 
early stage provides the network administrator with the 
chance to take early action before the network machines 
are  compromised.  The  alerts  provide  the  network 
administrator with information about the worm severity 
and infected machine as well as scanning behaviour of 
the  infected  network.  Such  information  is  useful  for 
facilitating suitable actions and correct decisions, such 
as  installing  a  firewall  and  anti-virus  software  or 
updating the existing IDS. 
 
Signature automation approach: The worm signature 
is  a  specific  string  that  exists  in  the  packet  payload. 
Signature-based  IDSs  such  as  Snort  (Snort)  compare 
this  string  with  existing  signatures  in  the  database.  If 
there is a match, the worm can be detected. One of the 
biggest drawbacks for signature-based IDS is that they 
cannot detect zero-day worms (i.e., the worm’s signature 
does not exist in the database). Meanwhile, some NIDS 
exist  that  check  the  content  of  network  traffic;  these 
include  AutoGraph  (Kim  and  Karp,  2004),  EarlyBird 
(Sen et al., 2004), Anagram (Wang et al., 2010) and  the 
LESG (Li et al., 2006) polymorphic worm (its signature 
can be changed each time it is sent to a vulnerable host).  
  The  signature  automation  approach  aims  to 
generate a behaviour signature for detected worms; the 
entry point for this approach is the network worm that 
is  received  from  the  network  worm’s  correlation 
approach,  which  takes  the  thresholds  (scanning  and 
DPCBWD approaches), used for the detected worm and 
automates  the  behaviour  signature  for  the  detected 
worm. The general behaviour signature rule is as the 
follows: 
 
·  <IP, Protocol type, threshold, time window >And 
·  <IP, DSP, threshold, time window > 
 
where, IP is the infected host, protocol type = {ICMP-
T3-1or  ICMP-T3-3or  TCP-REST  or  TCP-SYN},  the 
threshold is a predefined value for {ICMP-T3-1, ICMP-
T3-1, TCP-REST, TCP-SYN and TCP-SYN/ACK}, the 
time  window  is  a  specific  time  value  and  DSP  is  a 
Boolean (true or false) flag for if the IP exhibits DSP 
behaviour. The generated rules are used to detect TCP 
and UDP worms. 
 
RESULTS AND DISCUSSION 
 
  The  key  points  that  distinguish  our  proposed 
approach from many other similar works are as follows: 
 
·  No  need  for  prior  knowledge  of  network  worms 
since it is behaviour-based 
·  The proposed method has a new approach to detect 
random  and  sequential  TCP  and  UDP  worm 
scanning 
·  The accuracy of network worm detection compared 
to  other  similar  approaches  is  better  because  the 
approach  is  based  on  two  worm  detection 
behaviours:  network  scanning  (by  employing  a J. Computer Sci., 7 (11): 1724-1728, 2011 
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new  approach  for  scanning  detection)  and 
correlation between the source and destination host 
·  The  approach  can  distinguish  between  network 
scanning  (random  and  sequential  TCP  and  UDP 
worm  scanning)  triggered  by  infected  and  non-
infected hosts 
·  The  signature  automation  approach  generates  a 
behaviour signature that is not based on the packet 
payload (to extract the worm signature) 
 
CONCLUSION 
 
  Network  worms  are  self-propagating  malicious 
codes with destructive effects on network resources and 
topologies.  Network  worm  detection  is  a  challenging 
problem; in this study, we propose a new approach for 
worm  detection  and  signature  automation,  which  we 
named behaviour-based worm and signature automation 
that is based on three common network behaviours. In 
the near future, we plan to further improve the accuracy 
and efficiency of our proposed detection approach and 
develop  and  implement  a  general  system  for  the 
detection of network worms. 
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